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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO·MPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MRS. HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR, 
and 
MRS. GLENERA SHEEHAN HUNTER, 
vs. 
NICK CHOURNOS and wife, 
vs. 
MIL TON A. OMAN et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
stATEMENt OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9123 
The above entitled three cases were consolidated for 
trial before the District Court of Box Elder County, Utah. 
Each is a proceeding in eminent domain wherein Southern 
Pacific, plaintiff and appellant, filed suit to condemn a 
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2 
right of way over and upon certain grazing lands owned 
in fee by the different respondents and upon two mining 
uclaims" in which defendants Oman and Chournos and 
some of their family claim an interest. All of the real 
property involved is situated on Promontory Point, Box 
Elder County, Utah. The said right of way was needed 
to obtain gravel and other earth material as fill for appel-
lant's new railroad bed running west across Great Salt 
Lake from Promontory Point. The trial court, over re-
spondent's objections, granted appellant an order of 
immediate occupancy in each case and found the neces-
sity existed for the requested right of way. With the ap-
proval of respective counsel, the court then proceeded 
with the trial of the question of damages in the consoli-
dated cases. 
While the pleadings of respondents as well as their 
opening arguments endeavor to include numerous so-
called elements of damage resulting from appellant's con-
demnation, the actual trial of the cases here on appeal 
resolved itself into an attempt of respondents to establish 
two damage items: ( 1) Market value of the gravel taken 
in each case, and ( 2) Loss or damage from interference 
with sheep operations, or, a useverance" damage as the trial 
court described it. ( T r. 151-15 3 ) The evidence pre-
sented was directed to those items. It is that evidence and 
the court's rulings thereon which form the subject of this 
appeal. 
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows: De-
fendants' Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, is a colored 
map showing the general location of the gravel pits exca-
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vated by appellant, and the ownership of the various tracts 
occupied by appellant under the order of occupancy. 
Southern Pacific Company, the appellant, used the gravel 
and other material taken from those pits, along with ma-
terial from ad joining lands of others, to construct the 
new railroad fill across the Lake from Promontory Point. 
The parties in each of the cases stipulated at the trial upon 
the amounts of material taken from the respondents' 
respective lands, and the judgments for the gravel ma-
terial are based upon those amounts. The type of material 
taken was substantially the same in each case, and con-
sisted of gravel and other earth material as found upon 
the ground. Appellant used the material without any 
processing or other treatment, and placed it directly along 
the proposed new railroad line in the Lake. Approximately 
44 million cubic yards of said material of all types were 
deposited in the construction work, but the quantity used 
from respondents' properties amounted to approximately 
one million nine hundred thousand cubic yards in the 
Hunter-Arthur case ( #8071), about two million one 
hundred thousand cubic yards in the Nick Chournos case 
( #8191), and a little more than a million in the remain-
ing case. (Tr. 303, 361-362) The evidence disclosed no 
special use to which the said gravel could be applied with-
out some treatment, and respondents did not produce 
evidence that any such material had been sold or used for 
any purpose from their Promontory lands prior to appel-
lant's construction of the fill. In fact, the evidence re-
vealed that there would be no actual demand for the 
material at any time in the foreseeable future. (Tr. 32, 
38, 51, 60 and 94) 
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Respondents' only use of their Promontory property 
up to the time of trial had been as grazing land for sheep 
operations carried on by respondent Chournos and by 
lessees of the Hunter-Arthur lands. (Tr. 170). Mrs. 
Hunter and Mrs. Arthur do not own livestock and have 
carried on no such operations upon the lands involved in 
case #8071. (Tr. 169-170) 
The evidence is that the two gravel pits dug by 
appellant upon the Chournos lands cover 7.38 acres of a 
40 acre tract temporarily taken and occupied by appellant 
in one pit area under the order of immediate occupancy, 
and 29.79 acres of a 160 acre tract to the south tempo-
rarily occupied in the other pit area. This latter tract has 
no relation to the ((severance" damage issue. The two 
Hunter-Arthur gravel pits excavated by appellant cover 
18.44 acres of a 100 acre tract taken, and 17.92 acres in 
the other tract ( 140 acres) occupied under the court 
order. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) 
The whole borrow pit area #2, which includes among 
other lands the aforesaid small portions belonging to re-
spondents, covers approximately 344 acres. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4). That is the borrow pit supposedly causing the 
((severance" damage. We therefore see that the Chournos' 
land in that area excavated is only 1/ 49th of the whole 
pit, and Hunter-Arthur's excavation in that pit area 
covers only about 119th of the said pit. 
The court made the order of occupancy on October 
25, 1957, in the Hunter-Arthur case and on June 24, 1958, 
in the Chournos and the Chournos-Oman suits. Appel-
lant, on or before June 3 0, 19 59, surrendered possession 
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to respondents of all the lands held under the orders of 
occupancy, and as of that date relinquished any rights 
it had therein by reason of the lawsuits here on appeal. 
The testimony of respondents' own witnesses disclosed 
that the gravel pits made by plaintiff upon respondents' 
lands do not prevent the passage or running of livestock 
around or near them from one part of respondents' lands 
to another (Tr. 230). The map (Defendants' Exhibit 1) 
and the testimony established that no legal useverance" 
occurred to respondents' lands by plaintiff's taking. 
The court submitted to the jury a form of special 
verdict, containing a question in each case as to the value 
of the :fill material removed by plaintiff; and questions 
in case #8071 and case #8191 as to the useverance" dam-
age resulting to respondents from plaintiff's condemnation 
of their lands. The jury returned an unconscionable ver-
dict upon each item submitted. The court entered judg-
ment immediately upon the verdict for the :fill material, 
but held up judgment on the useverance" items until it 
heard arguments upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
The court at first sustained the motion as to the usever-
ance" item in each of the two cases, but conditional upon 
respondents' accepting and plaintiff's paying a reduced 
amount of such damage. Plaintiff declined to pay the re-
duced sum agreed to by defendants, and the court then 
completely overruled the motion for a new trial. Plaintiff 
here appeals from the court's judgment and its denial of 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial in the case and upon 
each item of damage; from the court's admission of cer-
tain evidence; from its submission to the jury of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
question of useverance" damage, and from other errors 
in law committed by the court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
I 
OF CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS 
TO THE VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MA-
TERIAL TAKEN BY APPELLANT; AND IN RE-
CEIVING INTO EVIDENCE THE RESPONDENTS' 
EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER GRAVEL SALES. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY 
THE QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND 
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN 
TESTIMONY PERTAINING THERETO. 
(a) THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRO-
DUCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT OTH-
ER SIMILAR LANDS WERE UNAVAILABLE. 
(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RE-
SPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM AP-
PELLANT'S O·PERATION UPON LANDS NOT 
OWNED BY RESPONDENTS. 
(c) THE SO-CALLED USEVERANCE" DAM-
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AGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' 
WITNESSES CONSISTED OF DAMAGES SUP-
POSED TO HAVE RESULTED TO A BUSINESS 
CARRIED ON BY RESPONDENTS, OR THEIR 
LESSEE, NAMELY SHEEP OPERATIONS. 
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE AR-
RIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF 
DIFFERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN. 
(e) RESPONDENTS PRESENTED NO· COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE 
OF THEIR REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO 
HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. 
(f) THE TESTIMONY DO·ES NOT ESTAB-
LISH ANY SEVERANCE OF RESPONDENTS' 
LANDS AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE 
COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE AND THE RE-
SULT OF PREJUDICE O·F THE JURY. 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
OF CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS 
TO THE VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL 
MATERIAL TAKEN BY APPELLANT; AND IN 
RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS' 
EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER GRAVEL SALES. 
The opinions of the witnesses called by respondents 
to establish the value of the :fill material taken for appel-
lant's railroad fill were based on sheer speculation. Not 
one witness established any present market value, or even 
one arising in the near future. To appreciate the incompe-
tency of the evidence presented by those witnesses, one 
must review their testimony in some detail. 
The first witness called by respondents, a Mr. Storey, 
was not qualified as an expert to render an opinion on 
values. He was not connected in any way with the gravel 
business, and knew nothing of the local market conditions 
for gravel. (Tr. 22-3 5) His testimony was that he had 
not made any appraisal of gravel properties for ten years, 
and he had no knowledge of similar sales in the area, nor 
had he made an effort to learn whether such sales had 
occurred. (Tr. 25 and 26) Over appellant's objection, 
the court permitted this witness to give his opinion of the 
uvalue of the material." An even more serious error is that 
Mr. Storey's opinion was admittedly based upon a ufuture 
value" of such deposits of material and a demand unot too 
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far away." (Tr. 26-27-32 and 38) Furthermore, the 
questions by respondents' attorney to Mr. Storey referred 
to uvalue" of the material and not market value. (Tr. 
2 5-3 1 ) This witness also testified that he did not know 
of anyone who would pay even close to the figure he gave 
as a value per cubic yard for the gravel taken. (Tr. 37) 
The second witness for respondents, Mr. J. P. Gib-
bons, testified that he is president of Gibbons & Reed, a 
construction firm in Utah, and had some experience with 
fill material and buying and selling of sand and gravel 
within the western states. Mr. Gibbons' opinion of the 
type or quality of the material removed by appellant was 
arrived at primarily from his brief inspection of some of 
the subject Promontory area before the pits were begun 
or any material removed. In fact, he gave as one of his 
qualifications for opinion testimony a plane trip he made 
over the area. (Tr. 43-44) As in the case of witness 
Storey's interrogation, nearly all of the questions directed 
by respondents' counsel to Mr. Gibbons referred to 
uvalue" and not market value. 
Furthermore, Mr. Gibbons' testimony is replete with 
statements that his opinion is pure speculation and that 
he was speaking of a ((future" value. (Tr. 48 and 49). 
Answering a direct question, he affirmed that his estimate 
was a uspeculative" value at this time. (Tr. 49 and 50). 
He testified that he did not know of any one who would 
buy the material, and that his firm would not offer any-
thing for the gravel taken, but uwe buy land on a specu-
lative basis in the hope that the future will make it of 
some value and it is conceivable that we would consider it 
in that light. I have no opinion as to what that would be." 
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(Tr. 48) When asked whether he would consider paying 
5¢ for the material (his given opinion as to value), he 
gave the unconsidered and irrelevent reply that he would 
uif he had that contract," referring to the contract appel-
lant railroad had let for constructing the fill project. 
(Tr. 47) Mr. Gibbons testified on cross examination that 
he considered the gravel materials and deposits of respond-
ents as ua natural resource that has a market or has a value 
when a market is established . ... There's a fixed number 
of yards of material in existence. Currently we are de-
pleting the materials that are closest to the point of usage 
. . . so any gravel that is of a satisfactory nature has a 
value on it. And the time and conditions will establish 
what that value will be at the time of consumption, but 
we would look on it ourselves, it is like dollars that are 
in the ground that will some day have a value (italics 
ours.)" (Tr. 51 and 52) From these statements by Mr. 
Gibbons, it is readily apparent that he was guessing at 
some value for the material taken by appellant, and that 
he did not consider it to have any present value as that 
term is used in a business sense and by the court in eminent 
domain cases. His testimony amounts to sheer speculation 
about a future value for some indefinite use at some in-
definite time. Appellant submits that if such opinion 
testimony is allowed to stand in condemnation proceed-
ings, the whole principle of just compensation for the 
award of damages is destroyed, and every party, whether 
public or private, faced with the necessity of condemning 
property, will be at the mercy of such speculation and will 
find the cost of acquisition prohibitive. The court's ad-
mission into evidence of Mr. Gibbons' opinion of the 
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ccvalue" of respondents' fill material was so prejudicial 
as to constitute fatal error. (For a .contrast in the lower 
court's ruling upon qualification of experts on gravel 
valuation see the discussion about Mr. Bagley's testimony.) 
(Tr. 296-297) 
There is also reversible error in the court's allowing 
Mr. Gibbons to testify about the use of other fill materials 
in the ((State of Utah," and on various projects in Salt 
Lake County. (Tr. 54) The general uses related by the 
witness were not connected in any way to a use or even 
a possible market for the material on Promontory Point. 
Mr. Gibbons never identified his road projects which used 
the fill material except to say uthe new interstate system 
in the state." (Tr. 54) His testimony was certainly 
irrelevant. 
Mr. Gibbons' opinion in court of 5¢ per cubic yard 
as a value of respondents' material appears to have been 
based primarily upon a document respondents introduced 
as their Exhibit 2, and identified by Mr. Gibbons as a 
survey from his office of different gravel pits from which 
his firm had purchased gravel in the years 1953 through 
1958. (Tr. 56-59) The court admitted this Exhibit in 
evidence over appellant's objection, and that ruling vio-
lates a very important principle of damages in condemna-
tion cases. The Exhibit contains references to purchases 
by Gibbons & Reed of gravel from California and Nevada, 
and various Utah locations not pertinent to the local area 
now under consideration. This highly incompetent and 
prejudicial piece of evidence is alone sufficient to compel a 
reversal of the lower court's decision in all three cases here 
on appeal. For example, the second ((NOTE" on the Ex-
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hibit refers to gravel material owned by Gibbons & Reed, 
and states that the materials were ucharged to the projects 
at ... 5¢ per cubic yard." How can any value or price 
set under those circumstances be considered a sale of sim-
ilar material under similar circumstances in the present 
case! (Neither the Exhibit nor the testimony indicates to 
what projects that uNOTE" refers.) Such an accounting 
procedure or entry whereby the contractor's own material 
is charged to the job at so much per yard is not a sale at 
all, regardless of the time or the place of the project. An-
other example of the shocking incompetency of this 
Exhibit 2 is its last uNOTE" at the bottom of the page 
where appears the information that Geneva Steel Company 
uoffered" to sell some three million yards of fill material 
uat S¢ per cubic yard." (The time and circumstances of 
the offer were never disclosed). That statement in the 
Exhibit cannot be considered as any reference to a similar 
sale of similar rna terials. An offer to sell, especially by one 
not a party, is no proof of a sale or of value. See Volume 
1, Orgel on V,aluation Under Eminent Domain, Second 
Edition, page 620-622, and the cases therein cited. This 
Exhibit 2 accompanied the jurors to the jury room for their 
deliberations in the trial court. No further argument is 
needed to point out what prejudicial affect such irrelevant 
and incompetent information must have had upon the 
minds of these jurors. 
The next witness called by respondents was Mr. Fife. 
He testified that his gravel company had paid all the way 
from 2¢ to 1 O¢ uon an average,"· for sand and gravel in 
place, and that the average price would be about 5¢ per 
cubic yard. In stating his opinion of the value of the rna· 
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terial taken by appellant, this witness actually testified as 
to what he and his :firm had paid for sand and gravel, but 
did not state where those purchases were made or what 
type of material was bought. His opinion as to the value 
of the respondents' material was not a true opinion of 
any market value for the material in our cases. On cross 
examination, Mr. Fife testified that he still held the opinion 
that the respondents' gravel material had no commercial 
value at any time, including the dates when the appellant 
took the material; that the only party who would buy the 
material would be the appellant railroad and that at the 
time of taking, uthere would be no market for it." (Tr. 68 
and 69) The witness further testified that he had exam-
ined the material and the gravel pits of respondents just 
prior to the time of the trial and that the gravel would 
require processing to be used for con.crete aggregate; that 
because of the haulage cost from the pit areas on Prom-
ontory Point, the respondents' material could not compete 
with the large supply located in the vicinity of Brigham 
City some sixty miles away. (Tr. 71 and 72) (The re-
spondents through their witnesses frequently attempted 
to prove the Brigham City area to be a market for their 
fill material). Mr. Fife expressly stated that at the times 
pertinent to the present law suits, no demand existed for 
the material and there was uno need for it," other than 
by appellant, at any price. (Tr. 74) 
Another instance of prejudicial error in the respond-
ents' cases occurred when their counsel asked Mr~ Fife a 
hypothetical question based on the assumption that there 
was no gravel on Promontory and the material had to be 
hauled from Brigham City. Counsel added up the esti-
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mated freight cost of such haulage, and then asked the 
witness if such a practice would bring the cost of gravel 
delivered at Promontory to $5.65 a yard. The court per-
mitted the question. Obviously, the assumption made in 
the question was contrary to the evidence that there was 
a large quantity of material at Promontory. More impor-
tant, it is established law that the cost to the condemnor 
of bringing other material to a job site is irrelevant and 
highly improper to establish value of material (i.e. prop-
erty) already there. (See Orgel, suPra, Volume 1, pages 
352-353). 
For a real trip into the realm of speculation and fan-
tasy, we invite the court's attention to all of the testimony 
of Mr. Ford, the next witness for respondents. Over ob-
jections of appellant's counsel, this witness was asked and 
permitted to answer questions ranging from the future 
business growth of the state of Utah to the possible future 
use of fill material on roads that might be constructed in 
the general area near Brigham City, but whose location 
and date of .construction were not known to the witness. 
The only source of his knowledge of those proposed roads 
came from what he had read in newspapers. (Tr. 95) A 
typical statement made by this witness was in response to 
Mr. Oman's question asking him to give his opinion as to 
((what will be the condition within the next :five or ten 
years for demand of that kind of material." The witness 
replied as follows: uwe (whoever that is) are using more 
concretes every year, by the national surveys, and I think 
this type of material will be in greater demand as years 
go by." (Tr. 94 and 95) Then the witness covered the 
subject of future ((industrial expansion." He testified: 
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uw ell, I feel that there will be a considerable demand for 
fill material, an increased demand as we grow in this area." 
The witness was also permitted to give his opinion as to 
how the present consumption of fill material compares 
with uwhat was consumed in this valley 25 years ago." 
(Tr. 96.) The court also allowed Mr. Ford to testify 
concerning a 1954 purchase from the State of Idaho of 
certain materials by his company near Soda Springs, Idaho. 
(T r. 9 8) Such a sale is so remote in time and place as to 
be irrelevant. That bit of incompetent information ad-
mittedly formed the basis for this witness' speculative 
opinion of the value of respondents' material. (Tr. 109) 
On cross examination, Mr. Ford testified that he did 
not know whether there was a willing buyer for respond-
ents' Promontory Point material; that he did not know of 
anyone who would p·ay more than 2110th of 1¢ per cubic 
yard for the material he examined at Promontory on behalf 
of respondents; that he knew of no person who wanted 
to buy the material at any price when the law suits were 
commenced nor at the present time; and that his valuation 
of the Promontory Point material of 5¢ per cubic yard 
was arrived at solely from the price paid in the above Idaho 
sale to his company. (T r. 1 09) 
PRESENTATION OF AUTHORITIES 
The court below, by admitting into evidence the 
respondents' Exhibit 2 showing other so-called sales of fill 
material, and by permitting the witnesses, Storey, Gibbons 
and Ford to give their opinions of the value of the ma-
terial, committed reversible error. The trial court also was 
guilty of prejudicial error in allowing respondents' wit-
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nesses to testify about sales of gravel material at times and 
locations far removed from the taking we have in the 
present law suits. 
The court committed reversible error in refusing to 
give appellant's requested instruction No. 3 limiting the 
jury to a finding of value for the material of not more than 
two tenths (2/10) of a cent per cubic yard, that being 
the figure established by the only competent evidence of 
value in the record, the sale by Mr. Adams to appellant. 
(Tr. 341, Exhibit 8) 
Finally, because of the incompetent testimony per-
mitted of respondents' witnesses respecting speculative 
and future values, uses and markets for respondents' fill 
material, and because the respondents failed to sustain their 
burden of proving the damages they sustained by appel-
lant's condemnation, the court fatally erred in refusing 
to grant appellant's motion for a new trial. 
Appellant submits the following authorities to sup-
port its position upon the above points: 
This court in State of Utah vs. Peek, 265 Pac. 2d 630, 
1 Utah 2d 263, ruled directly upon the subject of similar 
sales as evidence of value. The court held admissible the 
testimony o£ the owners' witnesses concerning sales of 
land located between the lots under condemnation for the 
uThis is the Place Monument" site in Salt Lake City. The 
lower court had rejected that testimony as well as evidence 
of the price paid in a urecent sales of a neighboring sub-
division." In holding that the lower court erred in reject-
ing this evidence, the court discussed W ig1nore on 
Evidence, 3rd Edition, and Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
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Vol. 5, and quoted from Nichols, page 269 to 277, as 
follows: 
u tU pon the question whether the price paid 
a·t voluntary sales of land similar to that taken at 
or about the time of the taking is admissible as 
independent evidence of the value of the land taken 
there is conflict of authority. It is held in most 
jurisdictions that such evidence is admissible.' " 
The Utah court then announced the following rule: 
uThus the price paid for similar lands, if the 
time of such sale and location of the lands are suf-
ficiently near and the sale is made without compul-
sion, is admissible in evidence on direct examination 
to show the value of the lands in question. How-
ever, to be admissible there must be a similarity 
between the two properties, even though they do 
not have to be identical in size or shape or possible 
uses, but there must be sufficient similarity in these 
respects and in proximity in time of sale and the 
location of the properties to satisfy the trial judge 
that such evidence will be helpful to the jury in 
determining the value of the property in question. 
" 
Appellant submits that the uother sales" testified to 
by Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Ford and the information con-
tained in Mr. Gibbons' survey list admitted into evidence 
as defendants' Exhibit 2, violate the above standards estab-
lished by this court in the Peek case because, as we have 
above pointed out, two of the Exhibit's references to price 
do not even refer to a sale; and furthermore, there was no 
similarity shown in location, time or circumstances be-
tween the Exhibit's sales and the acquisition of respond-
ents' materials. 
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The authorities on condemnation agree that value to 
the taker is no basis for an award of damages and should 
be excluded from consideration in a condemnation case. 
See Volume 3, Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 8.61; 
also Orgel, Volume 1, Page 352, (often cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court) where decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court are cited in support of the author's state-
ment that exclusion of value to the taker is the ((uniform 
law of the land." In our situation, the testimony of de-
fendants' witnesses amounts to proof not of market value, 
but what a taker should or would pay if and when he needs 
the gravel for some job. For instance, Mr. Gibbons testi-
fied that the defendants' gravel material would be worth 
S¢ per yard to him if he had uthe contract" for the project. 
Mr. Ford stated that such fill material had a value of 5¢ 
because his contracting company had found it expedient 
to pay that price in Idaho for a use not shown to be prob-
able in the foreseeable future for any fill material on 
Promontory Point, let alone respondents' material. He 
was speaking of a value to a future taker, not a market 
value, which he denied existed. 
In the condemnation suit of State vs. Noble, 6 Utah 
2d 40, 305 Pac. 2d 495, involving gravel lands, this court 
quoted from the Utah decision of State vs. Tedesco, 4 U tab 
2d 248, 291 Pac. 2d 102 8, some language that well shows 
the irrelevant and incompetent nature of the above out-
lined testimony of respondents' witnesses, as follows: 
(('"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a 
profit on his property. It must go to the condem-
nor for its fair market value .... The test is not 
what the lots will bring when and if willing buyers 
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come along, but what the tract, as a unit, as is, 
platted or not, and in whatever state of completion, 
will bring from a willing buyer of the whole 
tract.' " 
The Tedesco .case declares this pertinent rule: 
uA speculator or investor, in deciding what 
price he could afford to pay, would consider the 
chances and probabilities of the situation as then 
actually existing. A jury should do the same thing. 
They are not to inquire what a speculator might be 
able to realize out of a resale in the future, but 
what a present purchaser would be willing to pay 
for it in the condition it is now in." 
The Noble decision goes on to say: 
uThe measure of damages is (said to be) the 
market value of the property and not the output 
thereof. The accepted formula for determining 
fair market value is not how much would the prop-
erty produce over a period of fifteen years, but 
what would a purchaser willing to buy but not 
required to do so pay and what would a seller will-
ing to sell but not required to do so, pay." 
The testimony of all the respondents' witnesses rela-
tive to valuation of the fill material fails to conform with 
these rules of our highest state court. 
Volume 1 of Orgel on Eminent Domain, page 154, in 
discussing fair market value and speculative uses, states: 
((The courts draw the line at the point where 
it can be said that a purchaser would actually buy 
the property for the use in question. An appraiser 
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must be prepared to show that the uses which he 
considered could actually command a price in the 
market. The courts have variously stated that such 
uses must be immediately available within a 
reasonable time." 
The author quotes from the Pennsylvania case of 
A. D. Grah~ttm f5 Co. vs. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm., 
33 Atl. 2d 22, where the court announced the rule that 
((evidence of the value of land for a particular purpose 
is of no avail when there is shown no market for land for 
such a purpose. For example, a certain kind of timber 
might be useful in the making of bows and arrows but if 
there was no market for these implements, the timber's 
value for su.ch use could not be shown." The analogy to 
respondents' evidence of value is striking. 
Again, in Volume 1 of Orgel, page 15 8, is a quotation 
from a recent case, State Highway Commission vs. Brown, 
168 So. 277, in support of the author's statement that 
uthe mere existence of the physical facilities to make the 
use available does not prove that the use may be considered 
as influencing market value." That decision involved the 
taking for a highway of a strip of land used principally 
for farming. The owner contended that the property was 
available for industrial uses, and the jury evidently ac-
cepted that conclusion and awarded some $9,000.00 dam-
ages. The appellate court set aside the verdict with these 
words: 
uwe are reminded by appellee (owner) of the 
fact that the jury views this land insofar as adapta-
bility for industrial sites is concerned. These jurors 
might have gone the length and breadth of any 
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railroad in this state and found lands that were 
perfectly beautiful and perfectly adapted to manu-
facturing enterprises, but that fact alone would not 
authorize the assumption that such land would be 
sought and used for such purposes within any rea-
sonable time .... After showing that the property 
is adapted to a particular use and available therefor, 
it must appear that there is some probability that 
the land will be used for such purpose within a 
reasonable time. The fact that a manufacturing 
plant might be established upon the land within 
twenty years would add but little intrinsic present, 
determinate, market value to the land, whereas the 
probability that such a plant might be established 
thereon within a year or two would add materially 
to the present market value thereof and would be 
a basis upon which a verdict could be rendered." 
In our situation, the testimony of defendants' wit-
nesses on gravel values, and particularly that of Mr. Gib-
bons and Mr. Ford, amounts to no more than a forecast 
that defendants' fill material may at some future time 
have a value for some use such as a highway, at some in-
definite place. Defendants have not met their burden of 
proving any legal damage or value for the gravel taken. 
In considering the above decisions, we must keep in 
mind that the willing buyer or prospective user, or the 
demand or purpose for the property, as discussed by the 
courts, does not refer to or mean the condemnor. In all 
condemnations there is always such a party-an unwilling 
buyer who :finds it necessary to buy the property to fulfill 
a public need and service of some kind. 
We have already noted the objectionable statement 
in plaintiff's Exhibit 2 relative to an offer by a third party 
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(Geneva Steel) to sell some three million cubic yards of 
fill at a certain price. The particular ((NOTE" in that 
Exhibit does not even state the year or place said offer 
was made. An outstanding author on condemnation, Orgel 
on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Volume 1, at pages 
620-622, discusses the error in admitting such evidence or 
testimony. Orgel points out that such evidence consti-
tutes an attempt to get before the jury hearsay declarations 
of third parties as to value not supported by oath, without 
the right of cross-examination by the appellant. In sup-
port thereof he cites a number of decisions, including the 
Montana case of Helena Power Transmission Co. vs. Mc-
Lean, 99 Pac. 1061. There, in a condemnation suit, the 
lower court had allowed the jury to consider uwhat similar 
land has actually been offered for sale .... " The Montana 
Supreme Court, in ruling that such evidence was inad-
missible, stated: 
uWhat land has been offered for by one not a 
party to the suit is not a criterion of the market 
value, and the evidence of such offer is inadmissible 
for the very obvious reason that the offer is not 
made by one under oath and subject to cross-
examination. An offer to sell stands upon precisely 
the same footing as an offer to purchase, and evi-
dence of either is objectionable upon the ground 
stated." 
The court quoted from another Montana case, Yel-
lowstone Park R. R. Co. vs. Bridger Coal Co., 87 Pac. 963 
as follows: 
u (Furthermore, the value of such evidence 
depends upon the determination of so many col-
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lateral issues that it cannot be relied on with safety. 
The reception of this .class of evidence would mul-
tiply the issues upon questions of damages to an 
extent not to be tolerated by courts aiming to 
practically administer justice between litigants.'" 
Orgel, supra, page 622 comments: 
uWith reference to offers by owners to sell 
property not taken, the courts have held that this 
proof is not admissible both by direct examination 
and cross-examination." 
Attention is called to the decision of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Atlantic ·Coast Line R. ·Co. et al vs. 
United States, 132 Fed. 2d 959, wherein the court, in a 
condemnation proceeding by the Government ruled that 
offers which had been made to owners of land are not 
admissible to prove value and that an opinion of an expert 
founded in part on such evidence uought not to be ex-
pressed." The court also ruled that an actual sale remote 
in time affords no standard of value. 
The above authorities and comments apply equally 
well to the second uNOTE" on Exhibit 2, which, as we 
have heretofore observed, pertains to a bookkeeping val-
uation or charge made by Gibbons & Reed Company for 
its fill material. The time and the locality of the job or 
jobs to which that c:c:NOTE" might refer are not even 
indicated. Appellant submits that the admission of such 
evidence of itself constitutes reversible error. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY 
THE QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND 
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN 
TESTIMONY PERTAINING THERETO. 
(a) THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRO-
DUCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT OTH-
ER SIMILAR LANDS WERE UNAVAILABLE. 
The Utah statute giving a right to severance dam-
ages under certain conditions is Section 78-34-10(2), 
U.C.A. 1953, as follows: 
((Compensation and damages-How assessed 
-the court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties 
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain 
and assess: 
* * * 
u (2) If the property sought to be con-
demned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
cc (3) If the property, though no part thereof 
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, the amount of such 
damages." 
While the above Section 3 does not refer to usever-
ance" damage, we quote it for the court's information and 
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because much of the following discussion upon useverance" 
damage applies equally to that part of the statute. 
In considering the question or issue of useverance" 
damage, we must keep in mind that the 40 acre tract taken 
for gravel in the Chournos case was at the time of suit 
isolated from his other grazing lands on Promontory by 
property of others. Instead of being contiguous to his 
immense holdings of some 20,000 acres on Promontory, 
that tract was separated therefrom by distances up to six 
miles (Defendants' Exhibit 1) . Furthermore, the Prom-
ontory lands of Hunter-Arthur at the time of the com-
mencement of suit were on a checkerboard pattern, some 
parcels not even contiguous. Their two areas taken by 
plaintiff under its right to condemn were located, with 
the exception of two small isolated tracts of Hunter-
Arthur lands totaling 240 acres, at the extreme southern 
end of the 14,000 acres they owned on Promontory Point 
at the time of suit. The total pit area upon the Hunter-
Arthur properties amounts to approximately 36 acres 
(Appellant's Exhibit 4 and Tr. 204). Little Valley, where 
the said gravel pits making up borrow pit #2 are located, 
runs easterly across part of Promontory from the Lake 
shore, and extends through sections 2 and 1, Township 6 
North, Range 6 West, and into sections 6, S and 4 of 
Township 6 North, Range 5 West, in that order (Defend-
ants' Exhibit 1) . Respondents claim that the gravel pit 
dug by appellant for the necessary fill material has inter-
fered with and otherwise damaged their sheep operations 
over and upon their respective Promontory lands and in 
and through Little Valley, so as to cause them useverance" 
damage. Mr. Chournos also asked for and was awarded 
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such damages in the sum of $3,200 for the one year appel-
lant conducted its gravel operations on his 40 acres in 
Little Valley. The jury awarded respondents Chournos 
and his wife $32,000.00 for their claimed useverance" 
damage, and also awarded respondents Hunter-Arthur 
$32,000.00 for their claimed useverance" injury. (See the 
special verdict in each case and Tr. 361, 362 where an 
error of arithmetic occurs at line 13 for the temporary 
damage amount awarded Mr. Chournos) . 
The land ownership of Little Valley and the other 
Promontory lands with which the suits are concerned is 
indicated in color on said Exhibit 1. Please observe how 
extensive are the lands of Mr. Adams and the Federal 
Government in Little Valley. All of the Hunter-Arthur 
lands on Promontory were under lease to Mr. Adams for 
his sheep operations during the five years just prior to the 
trial. ( T r. 191 , 2 52 ) 
Point II of this brief is directed to this item of dam-
ages awarded respondents, namely ((severance" damage. 
In attempting to prove such loss, the respondents omitted 
an indispensable element of proof. They failed to prove 
that no land comparable to that taken by appellant was 
available for them to purchase. Mr. Chournos, testifying 
for Mrs. Hunter and Mrs. Arthur as well as for himself, 
talked of the importance in the whole sheep operations of 
all Little Valley and the total pit area (including part of 
Delbert Adams' land and Government lands). (Tr. 154) 
Chournos testified that Little Valley is c:c:the best place 
we got to go" to run the sheep east and west, c:c:we" meaning 
((anybody." (Tr. 160-161) At all times he emphatically 
stated that he was talking of the pit from one end to 
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the other. (Tr. 155, 187-188) But neither Mr. Chournos 
nor Hunter-Arthur established at the trial that they were 
unable to obtain lands in the nearby vicinity similar to 
their small tracts used for appellant's fill material. On 
the contrary, Chournos testified that about a year before 
the present suit he had purchased some Hunter land sit-
uated on Promontory about two to three miles north of 
Little Valley. ( T r. 18 8 -18 9) His witness, Mr. Keller, 
testified that other lands, including Hunter-Arthur prop-
erty, immediately adjoining Little Valley on the north 
were comparable to Little Valley. (Tr. 236) 
The decisions of this court point out the necessity of 
proof that similar lands were unavailable. In the case of 
Provo River Water User's Ass'n. vs. Carlson, et al, 13 3 Pac. 
2d 777, 103 Utah 93, the Association condemned some 18 
acres of pasture land as part of the Deer Creek Reclama-
tion Project, and the defendant owner claimed severance 
damage to some properties a mile and a half from the 
condemned land. The defendant's theory was that a 
uunity of use" existed between the pasture land and the 
dairy project on the remaining lands, and that the taking 
of the pasture depreciated his remaining lands. He con-
tended that all of his lands must be treated as Hone large 
parcel"; that his lands used for the dairy operation were 
more valuable as a dairy unit when used with the pasture 
condemned than if used without it. The Supreme Court, 
in reversing the damage award, held that the lower court 
erred in submitting to the jury the so-called severance 
damage, for a number of reasons. The court stated that 
all of the Utah decisions have c:c:predicated both severance 
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some physical 
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injury to lands not condemned, such as lowering or raising 
the level of a street . . . or restriction of the remaining 
area in size or shape, so as to render it less valuable for 
purposes to which it was formerly adapted. . . ." Then 
the court stated that it was not necessary to decide, under 
the facts of the case, whether the lands must be contiguous 
or must be physically impaired by the project to allow 
severance damages, but based its decision chiefly upon the 
defendant owner's failure to show that the pasture taken 
was not uthe only pasture land available within a mile 
and a half of the remaining property." Even if no similar 
uncultivated pasture land were available, defendant would 
not be entitled, said the court, to severance damages if 
there are other farm lands available for purchase which 
would produce relatively the same results. uEven some of 
defendant's own farm lands could be cultivated into pas-
ture." If defendant could purchase other pasture land 
or other land convertible into pasture uwithin a distance 
from his remaining land, comparable to that of the con-
demned tract, and such other land would provide relatively 
the same kind of forage . . . it could not be contended 
that his other properties could be impaired or depreciated 
by taking the pasture." 
Another Utah decision, State vs. Cooperative Security 
Corporation of L. D. S. Church, 247 Pac. 2jd 269, 
122 Utah 134, involved a condemnation of about 8 acres 
of defendant's farm land comprising 131 acres. The court 
ruled that severance damages based on the theory that 
the defendant's farm was a unit operation, could not be 
awarded. Defendant must first establish proof uthat no 
comparable land is available in the area of the condemned 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
land." This it failed to do. The Supreme Court cited the 
above Provo River Association case in support of its 
decision. 
The above objection herein being made to the so-
called severance damage applies equally to respondents' 
proof of the amount of such damage supposedly suffered. 
Mr. Chournos related that the lands remaining to respond-
ents after all the fill material was removed were thereby 
made 20% less valuable. He gave a figure of $1400.00 as 
the annual loss of value to his remaining land and the 
Hunter-Arthur lands. He determined his :figure from 
rentals Hunter-Arthur received under a :five year lease of 
their Promontory lands to Delbert Adams. (Tr. 170-171, 
184-185, 191) Then Mr. Keller, another witness for re-
spondents, testified about the amount of the ccseverance" 
damage from the whole pit area, and tied it to the same 
rentals received from Mr. Adams. (Tr. 229 and 232) One 
fatal defect in their testimony is that those two witnesses 
assumed there was no similar land available to the respec-
tive respondents. The above cited case of The Provo River 
Water User's Association, supra, ruled directly upon that 
point. In that decision the Utah Supreme Court found 
reversible error in the lower court's admission of testimony 
that defendant's remaining lands had a greater market 
value as a farming unit by using the condemned pasture 
than without such pasture. uThere were several fatal ob-
jections to such opinion testimony. First, the opinion 
testimony was based on the premise not established by evi-
dence, that there were no other pasture lands available 
within the same distance and no farm land which could 
be converted into pasture to provide the necessary forage 
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for cattle during the summer. Second, if another tract 
of equal value and productivity as a pasture were obtained 
to replace the pasture taken by plain tiff, the combined 
value of all of (defendant's) properties when used in con-
nection with a pasture, would be wholly immaterial and 
irrelevant." 
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POINT II 
(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RE-
SPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM AP-
PELLANT'S OPERATIONS UPON LANDS NOT 
OWNED BY RESPONDENTS. 
As this brief has already indicated, the only ((sever-
ance" damage which respondents attempted to establish 
at the trial was expressly related to the whole pit area 
#2, situated mostly upon Mr. Adams' land, and some 
lesser amount upon United States lands. (See the maps, 
Exhibit #1 and appellees' Exhibit #4) Mr. Chournos' 
testimony conclusively shows he used such a basis for his 
opinion of both his and the Hunter-Arthur damages. He 
stated that he had uto consider the whole thing (pit)" and 
did not know the severance damage resulting to respond-
ents from the excavations on their respective lands. (Tr. 
192-193). He referred to Little Valley and the whole 
pit area as his and the other respondents' own lands for 
the sheep operations. In testifying about the alleged dam-
ages to their sheep business, he emphasized that he was 
speaking of uall the pit from one end to the other." (Tr. 
154-15 5) Mr. Chournos talked of the ((forage damage," 
((hazards" and the ((interference" to the sheep from the 
whole pit in Little Valley. (Tr. 155-156, 164-165, 171, 
178) Mr. Keller, respondents' other witness on ((sever-
ance" damage, likewise referred only to the big pit area. 
(Tr. 227, 230, 23 3) In fact, he evidently was referring 
to the period of time when he held and used much of the 
Chournos, Hunter and Adams lands, including Little 
Valley. (Tr. 202) Respondents ignored the fact that the 
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excavations and the resulting difficulties of which they 
complained occurred chiefly upon someone else's land and 
to someone else-. (T r. 18 8) Respondents thereby are seek-
ing payment for damages belonging, if at all, to others. 
It is significant in this regard that Mr. Chournos admitted 
Mr. Adams, and not Chournos, rightly had used Little 
Valley and the big pit area for his sheep operations during 
the last five years, including about a year since the pit 
was there. (Tr. 198-199) Furthermore, no evidence was 
presented that any respondent had the slightest right to 
go·upon Mr. Adams' lands in Little Valley. 
The courts of our land have established that the own-
ers are not entitled to damages from the condemnor's use 
of a third party's lands and that it is reversible error to 
permit the same, or testimony thereof. A leading case 
frequently cited by the courts is the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Campbell vs. United States, 69 L. Ed. 
328; 266 U. S. 368. There, the Government had taken 
approximately 2 acres of the owner's land out of some 69 
acres he held, and the entire tract taken by the Govern-
ment comprised 1300 acres. The United States constructed 
upon the lands of plaintiff and the other owners Hroads, 
railroads, buildings, a sewerage system and such other 
things as are incidental to a large industrial plant." The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling which 
denied the owner the right to compensation for the use 
made of the adjoining owner's land, with these words: 
.:.:Plaintiff (owner) had no right to prevent 
the taking and use of the lands of others ... if 
the land taken from plaintiff had belonged to an-
other, or if it had not been deemed part and parcel 
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of his estate, he would not have been entitled to 
anything on account of the diminution of his 
estate .... " 
The court observed that the damages resulting to 
the remainder of plaintiff's lands were separable from 
those caused by the use made of the lands acquired from 
the other owners. uThe liability of the United States is 
not greater than would be that of private users (carrying 
on the same activities of the condemnor) . " 
At 170 A. L. R.;Page 721, is an annotation on this 
point, and it is there stated that the general rule denies 
the owner compensation for the reduced value of the 
remainder of his land caused by the acquisition and use 
of ad joining lands of others for the same project. There 
follows a list of citations from the courts of California, 
Colorado, Idaho, and Massachusetts. 
An Idaho decision, 0. W. R. f5 N. Co., vs. Campbell, 
202 Pac. 1065, involved a condemnation for the construc-
tion of a railroad. The owner complained that the railroad 
operations on another's land taken caused water to run 
through defendant's land and polluted his fresh water 
stream on the remainder of his land. The statute, like the 
law of Utah, provided for compensation for damages to 
property not actually taken, but injuriously affected. The 
court denied recovery, ruling that the owner could not 
be awarded damages caused by construction of the rail-
road on lands outside of defendant's lands. 
A Colorado case in point is Keller vs. Miller, 165 Pac. 
774, wherein the condemnation was for a right-of-way to 
construct a drainage ditch upon defendant's land. The 
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state statute allowed damages to the owner as a result of 
the condemnation of lands, taken, or injuriously affected, 
though not taken. The court denied the defendant any 
compensation for injury to the remainder of her lands 
from construction and use of the ditches on the lands of 
others. The decision quotes from Lewis, Eminent Domain, 
Section 569: Ct cDamages to the remainder by what is done 
elsewhere than on the part taken are not to be considered.'" 
In Public Service Co. vs. Loveland, 245 Pac. 493, the 
Colorado court refused to allow damages allegedly suffered 
to the owner's remaining land by the electric power plant's 
activities on lands belonging to others. The opinion cited 
the Keller case supra, and observed that cc:there must be 
a limitation upon the extent of the damages recoverable." 
In the California case of Department of Public Works 
vs. Emerson, 57 Pac. 2d 955, the condemnation was for a 
right-of-way to construct a highway over part of defend-
ant's lands. The owner claimed severance damage for 
failure to provide a cattle crossing for access to water 
available through a former crossing under the old highway. 
Neither the old crossing nor the water supply was on the 
property of the defendant owner. The court observed 
that the rule established in California is that the owner 
cannot recover damages suffered as a result of the rail-
road's operations and obstructions on another owner's 
property. The court quoted from the above cited case 
of Keller vs. Miller as follows: ccThe detriment for which 
the owner may recover compensation is that which will 
result from the operation of the works upon his land 
alone." 
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POINT II 
(c) THE SO-CALLED ((SEVERANCE" DAM-
AGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WIT-
NESSES CONSISTED OF DAMAGES SUPPOSED 
TO HAVE RESULTED TO A BUSINESS CAR-
RIED ON BY RESPONDENTS, OR THEIR 
LESSEE, NAMELY SHEEP OPERATIONS. 
Much of respondents' evidence of ((severance" dam-
age is actually attempted proof of interference with the 
sheep business. Even a cursory reading of Chournos' testi-
mony shows that fact. (Tr. 154-188) The witness and 
his counsel frequently refer to usheep operations" and loss 
to such operations from the gravel pit in Little Valley. 
Let us give an example or two from the Chournos testi-
mony given upon direct examination. Mr. Chournos, 
referring to all of the lands he owned, including the 20,000 
acres on Promontory Point, testified as follows: 
ceQ. Now, Mr. Chournos, all of these lands you 
have mentioned and roughly described, are 
they used in the one sheep operation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To round out a year-long operation, all of 
these lands are used by you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are they all necessarily used by you? Is it 
necessary to have all of them in order to carry 
on your operation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do these Promontory lands fit into and form 
a part of that over-all year-long sheep opera-
tion? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 142) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
uQ. All right now, Mr. Chournos, I asked you 
what importance, if any, the Little Valley area 
plays in your lambing operation. 
A. Well, Little Valley is one of the key valleys 
in that whole area. It's better for feed and it's 
not too steep." (Tr. 154) 
uQ. But I want you to tell us everything you can 
about how Little Valley has been used in your 
lambing operations. Are you through telling 
us that? 
A. Well, it's been used-· In the ·fall of the year 
we use the east side, and then certain time 
later on we'll go over the top, down into Little 
Valley and down to the shore, the mouth of 
Little Valley. It's pretty valuable, and the 
way it is now, you take that pit, that's around 
two miles long. You take a bunch of ewes and 
lambs-" (Tr. 155) 
Speaking of his alleged damages, Mr. Chournos stated: 
uQ. Mr. Chournos, you have described your own 
lands and the way you operate your own sheep. 
I now ask you what damage, if any, has been 
done your own operations by the removal of 
this gravel from the area in Little Valley. 
A. It will affect me in the same way." (Tr. 174) 
The trial court itself, in addressing defendants' coun-
sel and the jury at the beginning of Mr. Chournos' testi-
mony, referred to respondents' sheep business in the 
following language: 
THE COURT: uw ell, but you'll have to 
prove they're in the sheep operation business. Let's 
take one at a time. I may ask you a question about 
severance damages, gentlemen, if these people can 
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establish that their operation has been interfered 
with. Now there's a whole lot of ramifications to 
that, but just to introduce the subject to you now, 
it looks like we're going over on that question of 
severance damage." ( T r. 151 ) 
Injury or loss to business is not a proper element of 
condemnation damage, whether by useverance" or other-
wise. This court and a large rna jori ty of other jurisdic-
tions have disallowed such an element. In State vs. Noble, 
6 Utah 2d 40; 305 Pac. 2d 495, a suit for condemnation 
of property, including sand and gravel, the court rejected 
proof of the productivity of the fill material from the 
property and stated: 
uThe measure of damage is (said to be) the 
market value of the property. and not the output 
thereof. The accepted formula for determining 
fair market value is not how much would the prop-
erty produce over a period of fifteen years, but 
what would a purchaser willing to buy but not 
required to do so, pay and what would a seller 
willing to sell but not required to do so, ask." 
Quoting from a California case, City of Los Angeles 
vs. Dea.con, 7 Pac. 378, the Supreme Court commented: 
uEvidence of realized profits derived from 
(the business) receives the same treatment as gen-
eral business profits, and similar reasons are ad-
vanced for the exclusion of the testimony." 
A case cited by Nichols is Oakland vs. Pacific Coast 
Lumber a.nd Mill Company, 153 Pac. 705, wherein the city 
brought eminent domain proceedings for some shore land 
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containing docks and the owner's lumber yard. The own-
er's lumber mill, equipment and operations were mainly 
upon its property some 400 feet from the condemned 
area. The owner insisted that the taking of the one parcel 
interfered with its complete mill business and that all of 
its property was operated as a unit, even though not con-
tiguous. It also contended that under the laws of Califor-
nia it was entitled to recover damages for the uproved 
injury to its mill business." The state statute provided at 
that time that the owner was entitled to damages for the 
property taken and also damages uwhich will accrue to 
the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion condemned." The California 
Supreme Court held that the statute did not permit re-
covery for injury or loss to the lumber business. Here 
the owner claimed that the taking of the wharf property 
had adversely affected its whole lumber operation by 
making more difficult the handling of lumber. The 
opinion stated: 
uit is quite within the power of the Legislature 
to declare that a damage to that form of property 
known as business or the good will of a business 
shall be compensated for; but, unless the Consti-
tution or the Legislature has so declared, it is the 
universal rule of construction that an injury or 
inconvenience to a business is damnum absque in-
juria and does not form an element of the com-
pensating damages to be awarded." 
As in this California case, the Utah statute makes no 
provision for damage to a business, and that it is in reality 
what respondents claim when they speak of their sheep 
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operations and the adverse affect of the gravel pit upon 
that business. 
In the United States Supreme Court case of Bothwell 
vs. United States, 254 U. S. 231, 65 L. Ed. 23 8, the ·Fed-
eral Government condemned a large tract of land in 
Wyoming, upon which was conducted a stock raising 
business. Prior to the condemnation for the Pathfinder 
Dam the owner had run more than 1000 head of cattle 
upon the property. The owner had already obtained com-
pensation for the value of the land flooded by the dam 
waters. In the subject proceeding before the United States 
Court of Claims, the owner asked for a loss suffered upon 
a forced sale of the cattle and destruction of his cattle 
business resulting from the Government's condemnation. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the owner could not 
recover such loss of the business. The court stated: 
((Appellant's position in respect of the items 
in question is no better than it would have been if 
no condemnation proceedings had been instituted. 
. . . There was no a.ctual taking of these things by 
the United States, and consequently no basis for 
an implied promise to make compensation." 
The court cited the case of Mitchell vs. United States, 
267 U. S. 341, 69 L. Ed. 644, wherein the Government 
condemned certain lands used for the growing of corn. 
The owners were unable, as a result of the taking, to re-
establish themselves in the former business of growing the 
special type of corn. The Federal Statute provided for just 
compensation as determined by the President, and gave 
the owner the right to bring suit for whatever additional 
payment he felt he should receive. The owners sued to 
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obtain damages for loss of the business. The Court held 
that the owners could not get such compensation under 
the act or under the United States Constitution. The 
opinion stated: 
uThe settled rules of law, however, precluded 
(the President's) considering in that determination 
consequential damages for losses to their business, 
or for its destruction .... There is no finding as 
a fact that the government took the business, or 
that what it did was intended as a taking. If the 
business was destroyed, the destruction was an 
unintended incident of the taking of land." 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in U. S. vs. 
Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F2 172, passed upon a sit-
uation quite analagous to ours. The Government con-
demned some land used by defendant, along with other 
lands, for the raising of sugar cane. The Company had 
a working agreement for that purpose with the owners 
of the land condemned. The plantation (Company) 
claimed useverance" damages because of the uloss of value 
of its properties as an operating concern, resulting in an 
over capacity of the sugar mill and refinery." The appel-
late court, in reversing the trial court upon this item of 
damage, stated: 
uSince Plantation had no property interest in 
the lands condemned, this claim is for business 
losses. Since the right to recover such losses does 
not exist by law ... the contracting parties could 
not create by agreement between themselves such 
a right valid against the United States. . .. By 
adulteration, the experts for Plantation evolved a 
clever amalgam of two proper doctrines as a basis 
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for compensation. It is a rule that, in condemna-
tion of part of a tract owned in fee simple, just 
compensation is the market value of the tract as 
a whole, before condemnation, less the market 
value of the portion which remains after the taking 
of the part. The rule applies exclusively to con-
demnation of fee simple title of a tract in one 
ownership. It is a rule that, if market value can-
not be established by sales of comparable property, 
consideration of other factors may be necessary 
to establish just compensation. But it must not be 
forgotten that the market value of real property 
is the criterion ,and losses to a business are not for 
·Consideration. . . . Where part of a tract in fee 
ownership is condemned, the loss in market value 
of the remainder cannot be augmented by consider-
ation of the damage caused thereto by the taking 
or prospective use of lands held by third parties 
in fee simple as part of the same project. Nor can 
the fact that an enterprise upon one parcel depends 
upon other lands in fee ownership of third parties 
for supply of an essential material be used to con-
nect the two for purposes of compensation." 
Discussing the question of injury to a business, Nich-
ols, Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, Section 
13.3 at page 255 states: 
uThe case is no different when the business is 
destroyed by taking the land on which it is con-
ducted. It is well settled that when land occupied 
for business purposes is taken by eminent domain 
(the owner) or occupant is not entitled to recover 
compensation for the destruction of his business 
or the injury thereto by its necessary removal from 
its established location." 
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In Volume 4, Section 13.3 ( 1), the same authority 
uThe general rule in this country is that such 
business and the fruits thereof are too uncertain, 
remote and speculative to be used as the criterion 
of the market value of the land upon which 
business is conducted." 
POINT II 
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE AR-
RIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF DIF-
FERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN. 
The special verdicts in cases #8071 and #8191 
awarded respondents compensation for the gravel taken 
from their lands in Little Valley. Those verdicts also 
contain an award of compensation for an item loosely 
referred to by the lower court and respondents as ((sev-
erance damage." Under that name, the court permitted 
respondents to recover damages claimed for loss of the 
pit area as a pasture or ((forage" land, a lambing ground, 
a pathway for sheep to and from water and to other 
p·asture areas belonging to somebody. (Tr. 147, 152-164, 
171) Thus respondents were allowed to show a use or 
value of the lands for :fill material and, over appellant's 
objection, an inconsistent use or value for the sheep busi-
ness. Furthermore, the court admitted testimony of 
respondents which purported to show an actual severance 
damage to the remaining lands of each respondent sup-
posedly resulting from the gravel pits. (Tr. 177, 183, 233) 
In addition, the court, over objection, received evidence 
that the gravel pit constituted a nuisance and thereby 
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damaged respondents. For instance, respondents' counsel 
and witness Chournos talked of the resulting uhazards," 
udeath trap" to sheep, the steepness of the pit banks, cost 
of leveling them, etc. (Tr. 164-167, 178) (Such testi-
mony has nothing to do with severance damage and has 
no proper place in these condemnation suits) . 
Aside from the fact that all of the above outlined 
testimony referred to the whole pit situated mostly on 
third parties lands, prejudicial error in that testimony is 
that it permitted respondents to show and recover for 
inconsistent uses of their property taken, namely, as a 
gravel pit and as sheep land. The fact that respondents 
did not place a separate monetary value upon the lands 
used by appellant and upon various items of sheep land 
damage claimed, but lumped them into one general sum 
called useverance damage," does not alter the picture. The 
lower court itself during the trial recognized the principle 
involved but did not follow its early admonition to Mr. 
Oman that respondents would have to elect as to their 
damages. (Tr. 168, 171) If such proof of all these uses 
is to be permitted, appellant here will be required to pay 
more than once for the same land, and the meaning and 
intent of the Utah laws of just compensation will be 
defeated. 
The court decisions of this country have decried such 
a result. 
In Volume 29, Corpus Juris Secundu.m, page 1025, 
appears this statement in the annotation: 
ulf land is valuable for two purposes and use 
for one excludes use for other, only value for one 
use may be recovered," 
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ctttng Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. v. 
Monongahela Development Co., (W. Va.) 132 S.E. 380. 
In that decision the owner was permitted in the lower 
court to introduce evidence of the value of the land taken, 
both as a unit and as divided into lots. The court stated: 
uRecovery is sought by the owner on both a 
lot and a section basis. This cannot be allowed .... 
Of course, this rule would not apply where land 
was valuable for two purposes and its use for one 
purpose would not interfere with the use for the 
other." 
The court cited the Montana case of Railway Com-
pany vs. Warren, 12 Pac. 641. There, the condemnation 
was for a railroad right-of-way and the land taken cov-
ered defendant owner's mining claim for which he asked 
compensation. The owner was permitted at the trial to 
prove also that the land had a value for town lots. The 
court's instruction was that the defendant could not re-
cover for the value of the land both as a mining claim and 
for town lots. The Montana Supreme Court approved 
this instruction, stating that ((we cannot presume the 
jury disregarded the instruction, for it does not so appear 
from the testimony." 
The decisions and authorities usually state that the 
owner is entitled to show all available uses and can recover 
for the uhighest use"; but they uniformly hold that the 
owner cannot show a separate value or damage for each 
use and add the total as a basis of recovery. For example, 
he cannot have the value of the land as a gravel pit, and 
also a value or damage for another use. Nichols, Eminent 
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Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, page 105. As stated 
in the decision of Morton Butler Timber Co. vs. the United 
States, 91 F 2nd 8 84, the owner cannot uprove separately 
the values of various uses to which the land is adapted, 
and then add the separate items of value to obtain the 
compensable value of the land taken by eminent domain." 
That case involved land containing timber, and the owners 
attempted to prove separately the stumpage value of the 
timber. The court rejected such proof. That decision 
approves a Tennessee case, Alloway vs. Nashville, 13 S. W. 
12 3, in the following words: 
uThe court declined to permit all the capa-
bilities of the property to be priced separately and 
the aggregate to be calculated as the true value·, 
for they do not exist independently of each other~ 
and cannot all be realized at the same time." 
Also, Volume 1, Orgel On Valuation, page 151, states 
that uproperty has but one market value, not one for one 
use and another for another use." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Moyle vs. Salt Lake City, 
176 P. 2d 882, 111 Utah 201, has recognized the rule of 
recovery for the highest and best use in a case involving 
water condemnation. 
In our situation, the damage, if any, to sheep opera-
tions results from respondents' alleged loss of use of the 
gravel pit area for grazing and other sheep uses. In other 
words, they claim that the areas taken were worth so much 
to each respondent as sheep land and as part of the whole 
grazing unit; that by taking the fill material, appellant 
has destroyed that use of the particular area. 
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Appellant submits that recovery in this case for either 
permanent or temporary damage to lands not taken or to 
the sheep operations, together with compensation for the 
fill material, constitutes reversible error. 
POINT II 
(e) RESPONDENTS PRESENTED NO COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE 
OF THEIR REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO 
HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. 
The lower court committed reversible error in sub-
mitting to the jury the question of ((severance" damage 
for the additional reason that no market value of the lands 
of either respondent was ever established at the trial. This 
is true whether the alleged damage is considered to be 
under Section 78-34-10 (2) or 10 (3) of the Utah statute. 
The rule is that where possible, any injury to land not 
taken must be proven by showing a definite loss of the 
market value resulting from the condemnation. We have 
indicated that the decisions of Utah and elsewhere so hold. 
See State vs. Cooperative Security Corp. of L. D. S. 
Church, supra, involving farm lands, and wherein this 
court declared: 
uThe compensation to which an owner is en-
titled for severance damage . . . is the difference 
in the fair market value of his property before 
and after the taking." 
In State vs. Noble, supra, our court ruled that the 
property umust go to the condemnor for its fair market 
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value." The federal case of U. S. vs. Honolulu Planta.tion, 
stt pra, in declining to allow severan.ce damage in the case, 
used this forceful language: 
uStrict proof of the loss of market value to 
the remaining parcel is obligatory." 
In each useverance" case now before the court, the 
only testimony relating to money damage or depreciation 
of respondents' lands came from Mr. Chournos and Mr. 
Keller. They based their opinions on the annual rental 
Mr. Delbert Adams paid the Hunter-Arthur people for 
the last five years. Each witness applied a percentage fig-
ure to that rental for a year's damage, and then multiplied 
the result by an arbitrary number of years (20), to reach 
a ((permanent damage" figure. (Tr. 171-175, 191, 232) 
We submit that such an artificial, deceptive method has 
nothing to do with market value of the respondents' lands 
at any time. This court needs no authority to persuade 
it of the fallacies contained in such testimony. Mr. Chour-
nos, by use of the above method of evaluating damage, 
erroneously concluded that even though the Hunter-
Arthur Promontory lands contained some 5,000 acres less 
than those of Chournos, the monetary damage was the 
same because the Hunter interest holds ((a little more land 
close to ... the pit." (Tr. 187) Such speculation is not 
at all relevant to the market value of the lands. 
In some jurisdictions eviden.ce of the condemned 
property's rental income under closely similar conditions 
is admitted by the courts when presented by a qualified 
witness as an element of a market value of that property. 
We submit that is not the situation in the present cases. 
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It should be noted here that the testimony of both Mr. 
Chournos and Mr. Keller on the amount of severance 
damages includes the areas condemned by appellant, who is 
therefore being made to pay again for the gravel pit area. 
No witness for respondents indicated he was ac-
quainted with a market value for the properties, and re-
spondents made no effort to show any market value or 
even a reasonable substitute for it, such as a qualified 
appraisal. That a market value existed for the lands was 
made evident by respondents' own witnesses and by Mr. 
Adams. Mr. Chournos in 1957 had purchased a one-half 
interest in some Hunter-Arthur Promontory grazing land 
just to the north of Little Valley. (Tr. 188-189) About 
four years ago he exchanged some of his range lands sit-
uated to the west of Great Salt Lake for considerable range 
a.creage on Promontory Point. (Tr. 214-215) Mr. Adams 
placed a value of $5.00 per acre on his lands. (Tr. 332). 
Mr. Keller testified that he sold his lands on Promontory 
some years ago to Mr. Adams, and that he was familiar 
with the lands of all the respondents. (Tr. 221) But he 
was asked nothing about market value or even a value. 
An amazing illustration of the prejudicial error of 
the lower court in admitting certain testimony unrelated 
to property values (including fill material) or any other 
phase of the issues in our case is found in the cross-
examination by respondents' counsel of Mr. Bagley, the 
Project Engineer for appellant's whole fill construction 
job at Promontory. Over appellant's objection, he was 
asked and permitted to answer a question as to the ((ex-
penditure of huge sums of money" on the whole project. 
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(Tr. 303). What has that to do with the case, except to 
prejudice the jury! 
It is respectfully submitted that the respondents and 
the court, by completely ignoring the established and fair 
rules of valuation in land condemnation cases, are guilty 
of reversible error. 
POINT II 
(f) THE TESTIMONY DO·ES NOT ESTAB-
LISH ANY SEVERANCE OF RESPONDENTS' 
LANDS AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE 
COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES. 
Examination of the maps (Defendants' Exhibit 1 
and Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) in the cases here on appeal con-
clusively shows that severance of either respondents' re-
maining lands by the gravel pits on their respective 
properties is a physical impossibility. The Hunter-Arthur 
pits are on the extreme south end of their Promontory 
lands, and much of their remaining lands are not adjacent 
or contiguous. Chournos' 7.38 acres actually taken for the 
pit excavation was already isolated from his other lands 
by large tacts belonging to Mr. Adams, the Government 
and the Hunter-Arthur interests. 
The testimony of respondents' own witnesses is that 
the pits did not prevent livestock from passing through 
Little Valley, east and west as well as north. (Tr. 210, 235, 
236) Mr. Adams, whose sheep had exclusive use of the 
Little Valley area when the pits were made and for some 
three years before, testified that his sheep had gone through 
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and around the gravel pit area without serious interrup-
tion, and had lambed near the gravel pits in Little Valley. 
(Tr. 256, 257, 276, 277) The pictures of the borrow 
pit #2 introduced into evidence by respondents as Ex-
hibits 5, 6 and 7 show that the pit area is passable to sheep 
and contains roads through it. Mr. Keller admitted that 
Chournos' sheep could go from the east side to the west 
part of Promontory Point through a pass or valley just to 
the north of Little Valley. (T r. 2 3 5) 
The jury, the court and attorneys drove through the 
length of the pit area in Little Valley the first day of trial. 
(Tr. 15, 20, 21) Appellant, as stipulated at the trial, has 
surrendered all possessory and other rights to all the lands 
taken under the law suits here on appeal. (Tr. 150-151) 
Respondents therefore have the use again of their respec-
tive lands. in that area. 
What the respondents truthfully seek in their respec-
tive claims for severance damage is compensation to each 
one for an alleged damage resulting from but one source, 
namely, the complete pit area in Little Valley. Obviously, 
that is an unjust claim. 
Furthermore, the record here contains no competent 
evidence that either Mr. Chournos or Hunter-Arthur 
used all their Promontory lands, including the Little Valley 
area taken, as a unit. As noted, Mr. Adams alone had his 
sheep operations there under a herd line arrangement with 
Mr. Chournos, and there is no evidence that the respond-
ents' remaining lands suffered any physical impairment, 
loss or other injury from the gravel excavations made on 
their respective properties. 
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Much has been written upon the nature of severance 
damages, and there exists a divergence of opinion among 
the courts as to what is severan.ce and what is severance 
damage. See Orgel, Volume 1, supra, Chapter 4, and par-
ticularly paragraphs 53 and 54. At page 254 thereof the 
author states: 
ult would seem, therefore, to be unfair dis-
crimination to reimburse a property owner for all 
similar damages done to his property simply because 
a portion of it, however small, may have been con-
demned. Bearing this point in mind, the courts 
have attempted, some of them more vigorously 
than others, to distinguish between damages which 
a particular owner has suffered because a part of his 
property has been taken, and damages which this 
same owner may have suffered along with adjacent 
property owners because public works, detrimental 
to the remainder of his property, have been located 
in the neighborhood." 
Orgel pointed out that what the court should be 
interested in is to prevent one award ufrom overlapping 
and giving double damages." 
This court, in State vs. Cooperative Security Corp. 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, supra, in 
discussing the claimed severance of a pasture land from 
the main farm area, referred to the rule of a unity of oper-
ation or use between the different par.cels. The case turned 
upon another point, however, i.e., failure of the owner to 
show the unavailability of similar land. 
In another Utah decision, Provo River Water Users' 
Assn. vs. Carlson, et al, supra, involving a claim for a sev-
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erance of a farm tract caused by the condemnation of 
one parcel for a railroad, resulting in the flooding of some 
of the land, the court commented: 
uAll of the cases in this court, which we have 
been able to find, have predicated both severance 
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some 
physical in jury to lands not condemned. . . . " 
As discussed in Section II (c) of this brief, what re-
spondents and the lower court call useverance damage" is 
really a claim of interference or injury to a livestock 
business, which, if it is capable of proof, is not compensable 
under our law. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is no com-
petent evidence to support the verdict and judgment for 
severance damage in the cases now before this court. 
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POINT III 
THE VERDICTS ARE EXCESSIVE AND THE 
RESULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY. 
In the case of State vs. Noble et al, supra, the court 
stated: 
uour Constitution forbids the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compen-
sation. To just compensation and to that only are 
the defendants entitled." 
The verdict in each of the cases here on appeal was 
for the sum of 3¢ per cubic yard for the fill material taken, 
making a total of $57,283.47 in the Hunter-Arthur suit; 
$61,580.94 in the Nick Chournos suit; and $36,686.97 in 
the Oman and Chournos placer claim suit. In addition, 
the jury awarded Nick Chournos and wife $3,200 for the 
temporary ((severance" damage for one year's occupancy 
by appellant, and the sum of $32,000 as permanent ((sev-
erance" damage. In the Hunter-Arthur suit the award 
was also for $32,000.00 for the alleged permanent ((sever-
ance" damage. All the awards were in answer to a form 
of special verdict submitted to the jury by the court. We 
submit that these verdicts constitute excessive damages 
resulting from prejudice of the jury. They represent very 
unjust compensation. 
The lower court itself, upon the hearing of appellant's 
motion for a new trial, remarked that the ((severance" 
damage awarded ((shocks the conscience of the court." 
(Tr. 39 3) As stated earlier in this brief, the court then 
conditionally granted a new trial unless respondents remit 
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one-half of the ccseverance" amounts, but appellant refused 
to accept such a compromise. Appellant's opinion is that 
each verdict for the fill taken is just as shocking. 
One example of the jury's prejudice is the award to 
Mr. Chournos of temporary useverance" damage in the 
amount of $3,200. That sum is almost double any figure 
given by respondents' witnesses, including Mr. Chournos 
himself. Mr. Keller, with the aid of respondents' counsel, 
gave the figure of $1,750, and Mr. Chournos gave a figure 
of $1,400. (Tr. 171, 222) 
Much of the testimony elicited from Mr. Adams upon 
respondents' cross-examination, was calculated to preju-
dice the jury upon the fill rna terial and the useverance" 
damage items. Over objection of appellant, Mr. Adams 
was constrained to testify about the total amount of 
money he had received and expected to receive from appel-
lant company for his fill material, and what he was being 
paid by the appellant upon a lease of some adjacent area 
used for roads and certain operations related to the whole 
construction job, all of which was completely irrelevant 
to the only issues before the trial court, namely, the dam-
age suffered by respondents. (Tr. 335, 336) Some of Mr. 
Bagley's testimony obtained upon respondents' cross-
examination, was only for the purpose of prejudicing the 
jury against appellant by trying to show the immensity 
and cost of the whole job and the convenience and saving 
resulting to appellant from the availability of respondents' 
fill material. (Tr. 303-304) Those matters likewise are 
irrelevant to the issues before the court. 
A large part of the questions directed to Mr. Chournos 
by respondents' counsel, and his answers, were intended 
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to show not ((severance" damage, but to create a resent-
ment and deep prejudice by the jury against appellant. 
Reference has heretofore been made to Chournos' testi-
mony and Mr. Oman's questions about the hazard of the 
gravel pits to the sheep operations. We call the court's 
attention to other such matters contained in much of that 
testimony. (Tr. 176-180) 
When we measure each land owners' total award in 
these cases by the small area actually used for the gravel 
pit, and when we consider the nature of the uncultivated 
winter grazing land involved, we can arrive at but one 
logical conclusion: The jury's verdict in each case was so 
excess1ve as to be the result of their prejudice against 
appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Our Utah Supreme Court is the final and best pro-
tection appellant has against the unjust award given to 
respondents in each case now before the court. Such a 
result amounts to a heavy penalty to any party called 
upon, because of some public use, to exercise the right of 
eminent domain. 
For the reasons and upon the grounds presented in 
this brief, the judgments of the lower court in the cases 
here on appeal should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
W. J. O'CONNOR, JR., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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